T HE railway was the key which unlocked the economic resources of the Canadian West. The story of how the Canadian Pacific, the first important railway in the West, was built has frequently been told. It is important to note, however, that it was the customs tariff which was to provide the government with revenue to help finance the road. 2 "The difficulty of securing the means for the extension of the railway to the Pacific in the face of falling revenue... compelled the adoption of...
On the whole, so far as one can judge from newspaper reports of the time, the Crowsnest Pass Agreement was favourably received except in Manitoba and to some extent in British Co- During the first decade of the twentieth century western Canada enjoyed unexampled prosperity. Good crops, rising prices, the inflow of capital and settlers, the mechanization of agriculture and many other factors contributed to this development. It is significant, too, that the cost of transference of grain from the West to Liverpool was reduced at almost every stage m on the initial rail-haul by the Crowsnest Pass and Manitoba agreements, at the local and terminal elevators (through improvements in grain-handling equipment and elevator design), on the lakes, and also on the high seas. • These lower costs gave the farmer a relatively higher net return than previously. In the same period of time the railway network was steadily extended. • In one or two crop years there were complaints that railway equipment was insufficient to handle the grain traffic expeditiously but on the whole the service, as well as the freight rates, was considered satisfactory.
By 1911, however, there were some indications that the rate of expansion was slowing down. Moreover, all through the preceding period there had been complaints by westerners of the burden of the tariff. •ø17 Canadian Railway Cases, 128, 215.
•For details, see W. A. Mackintosh, Prairie Settlement: The Geographical Setting (Toronto, 1984), appendix A, table v.
•Ibid., chap. •'4 They secured so much publicity for their objections that the Manitoba Free Press declared that opposition to reciprocity was not spontaneous but "planned, nursed, financed, stage-managed and advertised" by .Toronto business interests.
The significance of the 1911 election on the subsequent freight rate development in Canada has been considerable. The West is fundamentally interested in two objectives: selling its grain abroad at the highest possible price and buying personal necessities, farm equipment, and supplies at the lowest price. To achieve the first, it needs low freight rates; to obtain the second, it desires a low tariff. The defeat of reciprocity cut off the West from its natural market in the United States and by putting the traditionally high tariff party in power prevented any hope of abandonment of a high protective system. Accordingly the West was thrown back on its first objective, that of obtaining lower freight rates. Canadian railways opposed reciprocity as being inimical to their own interests: now they were to be faced with the insistent demand for low rates from the western grain-grower so that he might more 24Canadian Annual Review, 1911, passim. easily reach the distant European market. It is not suggested that the farmer determined the connection between freight rates and tariffs in any logical way. He turned for help in the direction which at the moment seemed to promise the greatest relief from his economic problems. For him the matter was one of expediency but the underlying factors were definite.
The country had scarcely settled down after the excitement of the reciprocity campaign when it was caught up in the throes of the Great War. During the conflict the West enjoyed a fictitious prosperity with acreage expanding and prices rising. 1899 rates was essential if the West were to get necessary relief from the depressed agricultural conditions. On this point it may be observed that, while depression in an industry is one element to be taken into account in the determination of rates, it cannot be considered the only factor, otherwise by the same logic railways could appropriate for themselves all the profits of a prosperous industry. In any case the problem was decided from the standpoint of politics rather than of economics. At first the Special Committee decided to recommend to the House that the agreement be suspended indefinitely, but several western Liberal members who were not on the Committee threatened to vote against their party in the House if the agreement were not restored. By combining with Progressives and Conservatives the dissentient Liberals wou.ld be able to turn the government out of office. The Committee thereupon reconvened and on the pretext that Canadian National officials had found that the Agreement, if applied only to grain and flour, would cause less loss in revenue than they had originally stated in evidence, revised its findings. Over the protests of Conservatives who contended that the matter should have been referred to the Railway Board, the House accepted the Committee's recommendation that the agreement be suspended for a further period of two years but that the rates on grain and flour be restored at once to the Crowsnest level?
The whole scheme, with its obvious compromises with respect to time and commodities affected, was a device to secure the support of the Progressives on the budget which was then before the House. In view of the situation within the Liberal party this budget contained but few reductions in tariff rates. For a time it appeared that it might be defeated but eventually it was carried with the support of nine Progressives mainly from Ontario. The problem of getting the budget through the House was so important to the party in power that it was compelled to give concessions on grain rates in order to retain the tacit support of at least some of the Progressives. This is not to suggest that there were not economic arguments in favour of the substantial restoration of the agreement. The relief to agriculture and the fact that the benefits from lower grain rates would be shared by all Canada including the railways through a revival of business,' could be urged as reasons for the agreement's restoration. But these economic arguments could easily be honoured beyond their deserts. The fact is that the agreement gave the West a legal claim for lower The result of this long series of enactments by Parliament and rulings by the Board of Railway Commissioners is that freight rates on grain for export from the West are held down to the level existing in September, 1899. This principle applies whether the grain originates on branch or main lines and whether it moves east through Fort William, Port Arthur, and even by rail to Quebec or west through Vancouver. Rates on grain in Canada are from 40 to 50 per cent lower than those for the corresponding distances on railways in northern United States operating under substantially similar traffic conditions. Undoubtedly part of Canada's present railway difficulty is due to the unusually low statutory rates on grain. Nevertheless these rates may be justified on the ground that they permit Canadian growers to export wheat from the heart of a continent to the world market in competition with producers in Australia and the Argentine who have a long but relatively inexpensive water journey and only a short haul by rail where rates per mile are much higher than by sea. In any event the Western farmer is convinced that low grain rates are essential to his existence and though he may not have an intimate knowledge of past history, he realizes too that his favourable freight rates are a partial offset to the burden of the tariff.
This historical development may be summarized. In the first place there has been a close inter-relationship of tariff and railway policy. Originally tariff revenue was used to build railways but by 1911 a conflict appeared between the two programmes. The western farmer desired low transportation charges so that the net selling price for his wheat would be as large as possible. At the same time he wished lower duties on his clothing, his household goods, and his implements. The defeat of reciprocity cut off the farmer from the nearest market for his products and destroyed his hopes for tariff reductions on manufactured goods. The post-war depression in agriculture accentuated the problem. The rise of the farmer's own political party made the issue more clear-cut. A drastic reduction in the tariff in the early twenties was prevented by political circumstances within the party in power. Hence the demand for lower freight rates took a political turn which was aggravated by personal considerations and greatly strengthened by the Crowsnest Pass Agreement which gave the arguments for exceptionally low rates a plausibility which they would not have possessed on the basis of economic principles.
The second significant feature is the interference of politics. This factor is seen in the continued reference of the problem to Parliament rather than to the Railway Board, in the appointments to the Board itself, in the chicanery surrounding the application of Crowsnest Pass rates on grain westbound through Vancouver. Finally it is important to note how the sectional strains of Confederation have impinged themselves on the railway rate structure of Canada. To a considerable extent the Canadian rate-making problem has become a matter of satisfying diverging regional interests without completely ruining both railways in the process.
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